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Is government justified in being paternalistic? To some, the
answer is yes-government sometimes knows better than people do
what is best for them. If people are allowed unfettered free choice,
they will not always be acting in their own best interests. Others,
with a more libertarian bent, object that people know what is best
for them and, in any event, should be able to do what they choose
to do.
Recent scholarship has offered a new defense of paternal-
ism, ostensibly consistent with libertarianism. One scholar, Cass
Sunstein, characterizes the position as anti-anti-paternalism. 1 As
psychologists have demonstrated, people sometimes make 'mis-
takes' about themselves and about the world. And they sometimes
lack self-control, doing things they later come to regret. Their true
(or more correct) views might be in accord with what government
would push them to do, as might their more disciplined future-
looking personas. Thus, the argument goes, paternalism can be con-
sistent with libertarianism-especially soft paternalism, where the
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aim is to give people more information, or otherwise to put them in
a position to make more informed, and presumably better, choices. 2
2. Anti-Anti-Anti-Paternalism
Does the fact that people make mistakes and sometimes
lack self-control properly serve as a basis for anti-anti-paternalism?
In my view, the answer is no. The anti-anti-paternalist argument
turns on the idea that people are not (always) doing what they
really want. But how do we know what people really want? It can-
not just be on account of the mistake or the choice that favors the
present at the expense of the future. We surely do not want to say,
for instance, that nobody choosing to eat trans fats is doing what
they really want. Nor does somebody reporting at time T+1, after
doing something at time T that they wish they had not done (eaten
that dessert; bought that fancy new flat-screen TV; joined the health
club with the high initiation fee), provide the needed evidence. Nor
does somebody underestimating the probability of dying from
smoking and smoking anyway, or trading lots of stocks not know-
ing that statistics show that for most people, trading costs exceed
any gains they might make even if they are as savvy at trading as
they think they are. People are often of two minds, wanting, as it
were, to have their cake and eat it too. So, as evidence, we are left
with the existence of 'mistakes' and self-control problems in the
abstract, and our own introspection about ourselves (which may,
for all we know, be cheap sentiment). Importantly, at some deep
level, we probably think a short life spent partying and departed
with unpaid debts is normatively less desirable than a longer more
abstemious and financially responsible life; this makes us imbue
2 For a broad critique of Sunstein and Thaler's position, and particularly, the poten-
tial conflict between encouraging 'more' choice vs. 'better' choice, see Gregory
Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005) (re-
sponding to Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003)).
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our evidence as to the existence of mistakes and self-control prob-
lems with more strength than it has.
The paradigmatic cases at issue involve behaviors such as
smoking, drinking, overeating, drug use, riding a motorcycle with-
out a helmet, and riding in a car without a seatbelt; they also in-
volve poor money management, such as saving too little, or bor-
rowing too much. As pleasant as it might be to believe that people
with the 'right information' would do 'the right thing,' intuition and
evidence argue strongly to the contrary. At this point, who does not
know of the dangers of smoking? Even if a person's knowledge is
not complete and exhaustive, it is hard to imagine that more knowl-
edge would make a difference in her behavior.
Moreover, is wanting to do something at time T, doing it,
and later regretting it, a 'mistake'? A failing in self-control? Neither?
If a person acts now in a way he later regrets, has he made a mis-
take as to what he wants?
The answer isn't obvious. Anti-paternalists note correctly
that there is no a priori reason, from a libertarian perspective, to
privilege the future self over the present self. Anti-anti-paternalists
could respond that engaging in activities now which will limit op-
tions later effectively limits autonomy. But this argument assumes
without justification that autonomy is measured by the future,
rather than present, self. It also assumes that autonomy consists
importantly of the physical and mental ability to make choices at a
particular point in time.
What about regret? Regret might seem to provide an argu-
ment for privileging the future. But how can we know whether
what feels like regret is not as much a 'mistake' as whatever led to
the action being regretted? Regret could also be cheap sentiment: I
want to think that I am not a wholehearted hedonist - that I have
some regard for my health - even though yesterday I ate lots of rich
cheese and did not go to the gym.
Even if we somehow know that the regret is real, is it
enough to justify privileging the future? Here, too, the argument is
shaky. A recent article argues that immediately after people make a
choice favoring the present over the future, they regret it. However,
[Vol. 2:444
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once enough time has passed, those who regret are those who made
the future-preferring choice. Ran Kivetz, one of the authors of the
article, says: "In the long run.. .we inevitably regret being virtuous
and wish we had been bigger hedonists." 3 Consider, in this regard,
the oft-repeated platitude that "nobody has ever regretted at the
end of his life that he worked too little and spent too much time
with his family." What do people really want? Apparently, they
think different things depending on when they are asked.
What of the finding of behavioral law and economics that
preferences are constructed? Does it justify paternalism on libertar-
ian grounds? Again, my answer is no.
That preferences are constructed means that (contrary to
what traditional economic theory admittedly unrealistically hy-
pothesizes) they do not exist to be discovered and revealed by a
person's choice-and that they could have been otherwise. 4 Indeed,
in many and perhaps most cases, preferences are formulated as part
of the process by which the choice is made.5 It is certainly possible
that people can be influenced to choose something they do not
really want. Anti-anti-paternalists would like to argue that paternal-
ism here could play the libertarian role of helping people choose
what they really want. But even if people are not choosing what
they really want, it does not follow that we (or the government)
know what they do really want, such that pushing them in that di-
rection would be consistent with libertarianism. Preference con-
struction, taken seriously, means something much more, and fun-
damentally quite different, than people choosing something other
than what they really want. It suggests that what people really want
often does not exist in any prior unmediated form. There is one set
3 Clive Thompson, Hyperopia, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 10, 2006. The paper discussed in
the article is Ran Kivetz & Anat Keinan, Repenting Hyperopia: An Analysis of Self-
Control Regrets, J. OF CONSUMER RES., September, 2006, at 273-282.
4 This is not to say that all preferences are constructed. If I'm quite thirsty, I will have
a preference to sate my thirst somehow.
5 See Claire A. Hill, The Rationality of Preference Construction (and the Irrationality of
Rational Choice) (March 2007) (draft on file with author) (discussing preference con-
struction in detail).
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of cases-the paradigmatic framing cases-in which one could
make the kind of argument the anti-anti-paternalists want. People
ought to prefer vaccine A, which does not cure 25% of people, to
vaccine B, which cures 70% of people. Libertarianism is surely not
offended by government's recognition that there are some system-
atic errors of this sort that people make, and government's acting to
prevent people from making those errors by, for instance, requiring
them to read a booklet before choosing one vaccine or the other.
But most cases of preference construction are not about
making mistakes. The frame matters-but not because it is a trick
that causes people to make a logical or arithmetic mistake. Depend-
ing on how the alternatives are framed, I might think charity A, a
producer of low-tech toilets and glasses for Africa, is more or less
worthy than charity B, a developer of alternative energy technolo-
gies. Both are worthy; I may decide using some sort of decision rule,
where the decision could easily have been otherwise.
The anti-anti-paternalists are surely right that because peo-
ple are influenced by presentation-by a frame-we cannot say
with certainty that what people choose is what they really want. But
we cannot then purport to know what they really want and say it is
consistent with libertarianism for the government to frame choices
so as to get people to do what they really want.
In sum, the anti-anti-paternalists sometimes speak as
though they have access to the knowledge of what people really
want apart from what they choose. This position is ultimately un-
tenable. Behavioral law and economics can tell us that people some-
times make mistakes, and that they sometimes do at time T what
they will report at some time T+I that they wish they had not done.
But it cannot tell us what they really want, and hence cannot pro-
vide a principled basis for paternalistic law-making consistent with
libertarianism, hard or soft. As convenient and tempting as it may
be to extrapolate from our own introspection that others want what




3. The Anti-Paternalist View
Where are the anti-paternalists in all this? Not surprisingly,
they find much to object to in anti-anti-paternalism. They argue that
governmental actors are people too-if people subject to law make
mistakes, so, too, do people who make the law.6 Indeed, one scholar
argues that rather than offering a rationale for paternalism (or at
least, anti-anti-paternalism), "recognizing the limits of human cog-
nition pushes us away [from], not towards, paternalism," 7 espe-
cially given that people have more incentive to correct their mis-
takes than does government. There are also critiques that soft pa-
ternalism can be more pernicious than hard paternalism. Contrast
shaming with a legal prohibition, where the "undesirable" behavior
at issue is homosexuality. 8 There is also the slippery slope argu-
ment: soft paternalism, designed and justified as a means to help
people do what they actually want, will quickly become harder pa-
ternalism, government imposing its views on what people should
do more broadly. 9 Finally, the anti-paternalists argue that what
seem like mistakes or failures of self-control may be nothing of the
kind. A person who overeats or eats unhealthy food now is choos-
ing his present pleasure over a possible diminution of his future
longevity. According to Edward Glaeser, in consuming trans fats, a
person is "making a trade-off between flavor and longevity." 10 Anti-
paternalists seem ready to concede, at least for argument's sake,
6 Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 133-4 (2006).
See Cass Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 255 (2006).
7 Glaeser, supra note 6, at 134.
8 Glaeser, supra note 6, at 135.
9 See Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario Rizzo, Paternalist Slopes, 2 NYU J.L. & Liberty
411 (2007). See also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 258. On slippery slopes generally, see
Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
10 Dan Halpern, Dr. Do-Gooder; First smoking, now trans fats. Health czar Thomas Frieden
is determined to save our lives, whether it's good for us or not, N. Y. MAG., Dec. 25, 2006,
available at http://nymag.com/health/features/25642/index.html. That the new
paternalists accord the long-run self a privileged position without having any prin-
cipled reason to do so is argued in Whitman & Rizzo, supra note 9 at 418. See also
Glen Whitman, Against the New Paternalism: Internalities and the Economics of Self-
Control, 563 POLICY ANALYSIS, Feb. 22, 2006 (CATO INSTITUTE).
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that people might make mistakes and lack self-control. But they
think what people choose still offers the best guide to what they
really want, so that their choices should be respected.
4. What should we do?
Behavioral law and economics does indeed demonstrate
that what people want is not necessarily what they choose-that the
choice process is a complex one, and that people have complicated
and interesting processes by which they arrive at choice X at a par-
ticular time, processes that may reflect features of the comparison,
conclusions that they have come to in the short term, etc. We then
see that it is legitimate to sometimes not completely respect peo-
ple's choices. Many anti-paternalists do not have a coherent notion
of what people want apart from what they choose. But common
sense dictates the contrary: As O'Donoghue and Rabin note,
"[e]conomists will and should be ignored if we continue to insist
that it is axiomatic that constantly trading stocks or accumulated
consumer debt or becoming a heroin addict must be optimal for the
people doing these things merely because they have chosen to do
it."11
But of course, even if this is correct, what is a better guide
than people's choices? Even if people may really want something
else, what might that be, and on what grounds can we claim we
have access to it that gives us a better claim on what they are going
to do than what they otherwise would choose?
In my view, the anti-anti-paternalists ultimately have it
right as to what should be done. But they are right for the wrong
reason. They are ultimately hard pressed to justify paternalistic in-
tervention either on grounds that it furthers autonomy or on
grounds that it improves welfare.1 2 The anti-anti-paternalists ac-
11 Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a
Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AMER. ECON. REV. 186 (2003).
12 In this regard, Mitchell, supra note 2, argues that Sunstein and Thaler seem to use
welfarist criteria to determine whether people are better off when libertarians would
[Vol. 2:444
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knowledge that preferences are constructed. Thus, as an initial mat-
ter, it is hard to see how we can say that something that might very
well affect the preferences themselves furthers autonomy in choice.
And, going further, I have argued that 'what people really want' is
not an intelligible concept. Thus, what would it mean to help people
choose what they really want? Finally, even if we assume that we
do know what some people really want - for instance, to do a fu-
ture-preferring act notwithstanding that they are instead doing a
present-preferring act - we do not know that all people are like this.
Indeed, as the anti-anti-paternalists acknowledge, some people
might very well be making their 'real' choices. To the extent we
have paternalistic policies that encourage future-preferring behav-
ior we have perhaps hindered the autonomy of the present-
preferring contingent. Consider a requirement that full nutritional
information be included on all restaurant menus: what if I would
like (as I do) to make the choice knowing in general terms that the
food is more caloric than nutritious but without knowing that the
specifics are close at hand? Giving information is not a neutral
meta-act; showing photos of mangled fetuses outside an abortion
clinic or dead bodies outside a gun shop is not just 'providing in-
formation' that helps people choose 'what they really want.'
Welfare, too, can scarcely be deemed to be furthered with-
out a pre-existing sense of what constitutes welfare enhancement.
Again, the (unwarranted) presumption that people would be better
off and more true to themselves if they made more future-regarding
decisions seems to dictate the anti-anti-paternalists' conclusion.
While the anti-anti-paternalists recognize that some people would
and do freely make incorrect choices, their starting point-that
people make mistakes and lack self-control-probably leads them
to believe that but for the mistakes and self-control problems, peo-
ple would more often make the 'correct' choice - that is, as I have
look to autonomy: The libertarian aim is best advanced when people are put in the
position to make their own choices, not necessarily correct choices on some norma-
tive metric.
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argued, the one that is correct as judged by some implicit normative
metric. 13
Still, the overall policy thrust, in broad brush, seems right.
As the anti-anti-paternalists argue, there is no way to be wholly lib-
ertarian and truly and completely respect people's pure and pre-
existing unmrediated choices. There need to be default rules, and
these will clearly influence behavior. As Cass Sunstein notes, de-
fault rules must be chosen: they do not come from nature or drop
from the sky.14
Furthermore, in most paternalistic interventions, there are
externalities, and necessarily so. Presumably, people whose short-
term decisions might result in long-term costs-say, motorcycle
riders who do not wear helmets-cannot feasibly commit to not
taking state money for their care. And it seems clear that there is a
normative inclination, stemming from what can be characterized as
shared values: that investment in the future, broadly construed, is
somehow preferable to consuming all in the moment. Finally,
common sense and introspection suggest that there does exist
something on the order of temptation that we may for ourselves
want government to help us resist; we may believe, although we
cannot know, that a not-insignificant number of others also are like
us in this regard. All this suffices to warrant carefully conceived
and crafted policy prescriptions.
None of this is to suggest that paternalism does not warrant
considerable wariness, or that devising appropriate policies will be
13 Indeed, that 'helping' people get it right using information or debiasing or other
like means is more justifiable than forcing them suggests an odd confusion as to the
rationale justifying any intervention. What ostensibly justifies intervention is that
people are making mistakes, behaving 'irrationally.' But what is the relationship
between providing information or debiasing, on the one hand, and helping people
behave more rationally? If people who smoke in the face of information indicating
that smoking is harmful are irrational, presumably the more information they have,
the more irrational they must be. Our intuitive alternative, concluding that once
people have enough information, if they continue to smoke they are truly choosing
to do so, doesn't help us to distinguish between people who are irrational and people
who are really making a choice.
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easy. Imagine a policy prompted by the types of arguments made in
Robert Frank's Luxury Fever:'5 that there is an arms race as to status-
seeking. People spend money and effort acquiring positional goods
such as fancy cars; their neighbors get even fancier cars, and they
have to get even fancier cars to compete. Frank proposes that this
problem be addressed with steeply progressive consumption taxes.
But the fact that some people like fancy cars because they want to
be fancier than their neighbors does not mean all people do. There
are people who like some positional goods for those goods' inherent
attributes; those people might very well be hurt, and, it would
seem, only because of others' status-seeking.
Another example: Imagine that we are trying to tax activi-
ties we think people do not really want to engage in, such as con-
sumption of cigarettes or unhealthy foods. Uncontroversially, the
tax should be high enough to force people to internalize the exter-
nality associated with the activities. But how about the internality-
that is, the cost to the future self? It is hard even in principle to
imagine how to make this computation.
All this being said, ultimately I think Ted O'Donoghue and
Matthew Rabin are correct. Despite their reservations, including
"fears of regulatory capture or transactions costs implementation"
and the difficulty of correctly identifying "all the plausible mistakes
people can make" they "are even more hesitant to continue to make
policy prescriptions based solely on the axiom of 100-percent ra-
tionality. The possibilities that 15-year-olds err in becoming tobacco
addicts or that 25-year-olds err in borrowing heavily on their credit
cards or that 35-year olds err in too wildly playing the stock market
with their retirement savings all strike us as profoundly plausible
and of real policy relevance." 16 They conclude as follows: "It there-
fore seems to us that policy analysis that incorporates the substan-
tive insights and methodological rigors of economics, while being
more realistic about the nature of errors people make, should be
14 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 259.
15 ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER (2000).
16 See O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 11, at 191.
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enthusiastically and quickly embraced." 17 One need not use the
language of rationality and error-people can, and do, have con-
flicting goals. Law can appropriately help them choose between
those goals, especially if law has other reasons to do so.
